Introduction
The recent global economic and financial crisis implied a great socio-economic challenge for the Western industrialized countries and other countries during the period of 2007-2010. This crisis itself has been immediately caused by the bursting of the United States (U.S.) housing bubble, which has been the result of an increasing overvaluation of real estate and of its financing though the sub-prime market. This in turn created immense financial problems for the two largest mortgage lenders in the U.S., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In consequence, both institutions had to declare insolvency, and survived only because of state assistance given by the U.S. government. In the wake of the subprime crisis more banks had to cope with financial difficulties, and from this point onwards the crisis did not remain restricted mainly to the U.S. but evolved to a global financial and economic crisis. In particular, the bankruptcy of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 induced fears on the international financial market of defaults in international lending, which ultimately led to a complete standstill of the interbank market. This adverse development was, however, not only restricted to the financial sector, but also had effects on companies in the real economy.
These were affected by both, the restrictive lending by financial institutions and the consumer behavior of unsettled consumers. For example, in the automotive sector, all the Western car producing countries were faced with declines in automotive production and sales during the crisis. Essentially, the overall economic performance of the industrialized countries fell significantly in 2009 -leading to comparisons with the world economic crisis of 1929 (see Schäfer 2008: 808ff.; ILO 2010; Taylor 2010: 12ff.; Schirm 2011: 47) .
The reactions of the Western states, however, diverged with respect to the economic policies undertaken to solve the crisis, ranging from bail outs to economic stimulus packages. This said, also altogether a sharp increase in state aid can be identified for 2008 compared to previous years as can be seen on Table 1 . Interestingly, this is even true for states, which have been rather critical regarding state interventions. Furthermore, in prior crises, such as the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001 no increases in aid flows were recorded. Thus, the research questions in this paper are (1) why did national governments change their strategies of small state intervention measures and (2) why did the state intervention measures diverge between the examined countries (Germany and the United Kingdom, UK). This study is based on examples of the following sectors: the financial sector, the automotive industry and electric mobility. It will be assumed that internal social factors can explain state intervention measures in times of a crisis. In this case, the independent variables are interests, ideas and institutions. These will be discussed in more detail later in the text.
State intervention measures in the global economic and financial crisis
In this analysis, "state intervention measures" are defined as the complete state intervention by the government in private economic activities of a country, which in this case, are crisisrelated. The term has to be distinguished from the adjacent terms "regulatory policy" and "industrial policy", which are nonetheless equally important within the discussion about state activity during the economic and financial crisis. While regulatory policy, however, refers to the state's task to define the economic conditions of a country, state intervention measures have to be understood as interventions in private sector activities. The differentiation from the term industrial policy is logically based on the finding that not every sector which received assistance by the state during the latest crisis, has necessarily, in the strict sense, to be an 1 Definition of the term "State Aid" by Eurostat (2011): The numerator is the sum of all state aid granted to specific sectors (agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, coal, transport except railways and other services), State aid given on an ad-hoc basis to individual companies e.g., for rescue and restructuring, and state aid for horizontal objectives such as research and development, safeguarding the environment, energy saving, support to small and medium-sized enterprises, employment creation, the promotion of training and aid for regional development. 3 In the course of the following elaborations, the second (subsidies) and the third point (coordination) will be relevant.
Theoretical Debate
As the introductory question already pointed out, this paper is located in the field of comparative political economy (CPE). Through country and sector studies, the relationship between the spheres of politics, economy and society will be comparatively analyzed, so as to gain an understanding of the relevant causal relationships. However, CPE is by no means a homogeneous theoretical building. On the contrary, it is marked by a variety of approaches whose focuses can be both empirical-analytical and normative. Since this paper deals with the questions of how internal societal factors can explain government actions, and since its focus is empirical-analytical, approaches such as neo-gramscianism (normative) as well as neorealism and neo-mercantilism (state as a black box) will not be considered. Instead, the theoretical basis will be provided by liberalism and institutionalism. These approaches are presented in section 3.1. The explanation of the theoretical analytical framework, the relevant definitions, and the justification of the independent variables as well as the derivation of the research hypotheses will follow in section 3.2.
Overview of the main theoretical approaches
Liberalism emphasizes the importance of the national decision-making process for the formation of economic policy preferences of national governments (see Frieden 1995 , Moravcsik 1997 , Katzenstein 2005 . According to Frieden, for instance, mainly the economic preferences of national economic sectors are crucial for the policy that is made by national governments. "The economic circumstances of each sector to lead sectoral policy preferences with predictable implications for domestic bargaining over foreign economic policy" (Frieden 1995: 283) . In this respect, its assumption overlaps with that of Moravcsik. Besides interests,
Moravcsik emphasizes additionally the importance of ideas and institutions. "Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments" (Moravcsik 1997: 513) . Furthermore, Katzenstein highlights that the effects of the global economy to the individual states are not visible without an understanding of the domestic factors. "More generally, the effects of economic internationalization can not be understood apart from the deeply rooted domestic institutions, ideas, and interests that shape the preferences of actors, thus bending considerations of international economic efficiency to distinctive national purposes" (Katzenstein 2005: 18-19 ) . Because of the emphasis on the internal social factors the liberal approach, thus, offers a good starting point for an analysis of the question why national governments find diverging answers to the global financial and economic crisis. However, it should be noted that liberalism focuses primarily on the importance of interests and ideas and that the variable institutions remains widely unconsidered in this approach. This study however assumes that institutional factors play equally an important role in the decision-making process for state intervention measures.
In this regard, institutionalism provides some complementarities. The approach can be divided into several kinds/types of institutionalism. All of them emphasize that institutional factors are crucial in the intra-societal preference formation. However, they make different statements regarding the origin, logic and action within institutions. Essentially, there are three types of institutionalism to be distinguished: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (see Hall/Taylor 1996) . The historical variant assumes that institutions develop evolutionary. Emphasis is made on the importance of path dependency as well as the unintended consequences of any decision taken for further development. These developments ultimately decide about the influence of one particular institution, and they affect actors' decision-making (see Hall/Taylor 1996: 937ff.; Sanders 2006. 39ff.) . The rational choice institutionalism by contrast, does not assume historical paths that affect actors'
behavior, but that this action is shaped by strategic behavior. In this respect, the objective to be achieved is to maximize the actors' preferences. By the same rational logic the approach explains further the emergence of institutions. These are therefore agreements of rational actors who hope to benefit from their existence (see Hall/Taylor 1996: 944f.; Shepsle 2006: 23ff.) . The sociological institutionalism, however, keeps some distance to these views. It rather understands institutions as expressions of cultural and ideological realities within a society. "Instead, they argue that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as cultural-specific practices [...] and assimilated into organizations" (Hall/Taylor 1996: 946) .
In direct reference to these three types of institutionalism Hall/Soskice (2001) developed the Varieties of Capitalisms (VoC) approach, which assumes that there are two distinguishable ideal types among the Western economies due to their institutional design. One of them is called liberal market economies (LME), which are typically represented by the Anglo-Saxon countries. The other ideal type is the coordinated market economies (CME) with Germany being the main representative. The VoC was designed as a firm-centered approach, and thus, it emphasizes the behavior of companies. Of critical importance are thereby institutional complementarities. The approach always infers to institutions whenever these complement each other and are thus of mutual benefit (see Hall/Gingerich 2004; Amable 2000) . Since the VoC is a company-centered approach, the behavior of states or the influence of governments by companies is of minor interest. In this study however, these aspects have to be put in the foreground. It should however be highlighted that the state's role in the CMEs is fundamentally different than in the LMEs. Whereas on the one hand in coordinated market economies the state is perceived as an actor that regulates the economy and, where appropriate, provides some support, on the other hand, in the liberal economies the belief of the "lean state" prevails, with the state only holding a rule setting function. Its influence on the market is limited to (low) taxation and only the most necessary social services (see Green/ Mostafa/Preston 2010: 24). State intervention is therefore not to be expected in LMEs, whereas in CMEs the possibility of saving or stabilization of companies or industries as a (last) means exists.
Societal Approach as theoretical framework: interests, ideas and institutions
Based on the considerations made in the last paragraph of this paper, these elaborations are built on the assumptions of liberalism and the institutionalist view of the VoC. In the following, therefore, a liberal-institutionalist approach will be developed, which emphasizes the high explanatory value of the explanatory variables, social interests, ideas and institutions.
These variables are supposed to explain the dependent variable, which is here defined as state intervention measures. The approach refers to the societal approach of Schirm (2011; ), which in turn is based on the liberal approach of Moravcsik, and to some extent the VoC. In contrast to Moravcsik, this approach is to a much greater extent oriented on an empirical verifiability. At its core, Schirm defines interests and ideas as independent variables to be tested, whereby the definition of the variable ideas also includes an institutional aspect.
Interests are defined as "material economic considerations of domestic groups which can alter rapidly according to changing circumstances understood as new benefits and costs induced by globalization and (new) global governance" (Schirm, 2009: 504) . This assumption assumes that economic actors adjust their preferences in the context of changing circumstances like the economic crisis, and that they adjust to the new requirements. While this definition reveals the similarities with the liberal approach (see above), the definition of the variable ideas also points on thoughts from the institutionalist or VoC literature: "Ideas relevant for formulating preferences on global economic governance are defined here as path-dependent and valuebased collective expectations on how politics should govern the market. Ideas can express themselves in societal attitudes and, in institutionalised form in the political culture and system of a country" (Schirm, 2009: 504) . This is assumed to be a relatively broad understanding of ideas, which includes institutions into the definition as a kind of "solidified ideas". However, for the theoretical framework as it is used here, ideas and institutions have to be separated again.
Interests
According to Schirm interests shall be understood as material considerations, in the sense of vested interests of particular groups. It will therefore be assumed that interests have a high explanatory value, when single and cohesive firms or economic sectors are affected. Their representatives express their concerns and demands to the respective national government.
The formulation of these interests may change quickly, depending on the situation and circumstances. For example, an economic crisis might lead the affected companies and industries to call for public support, while in "normal" times (when a crisis is absent) an economic interference of the state would be criticized. Whether and how the government follows the sectoral interests is assumed to be determined according to the economic performance of the sector, its importance for the labor market and its relevance for other economic sectors. If these factors are given for the affected sector, it is expected that the government takes the sectoral interests into consideration. This is, because not only the interest groups must be seen as rational actors, but also those politicians and political parties involved in government, because of their individual aim to remain in office and to win the next election (see Downs 1968: 34; Schirm 2011: 51) . The government's decision not to follow particular interests could thus be mainly due to a lack of homogeneity of the people who represent the interests or to a minor economic importance of the sector. Finally, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Institutions
Here, it is assumed that the origin of institutions can differ from case to case. Thus, it could be possible that some institutions are "solidified ideas" according to Schirm (2009) .
Otherwise institutions can also be rational agreements according to rational choice institutionalism. The essential matter for the following analysis is the definition of institutions as formal or informal ruling systems, whose existence is given regardless of their origin.
Furthermore, they restrict actors in their decision-making process to a certain extent -whether rational or emotional -but it does not completely determine its actions, as is assumed in the VoC. On this basis, the third hypothesis is the following:
Working hypothesis 3: Institutions
If functional market-based or non-market forms of coordination exist, then national governments will use them and do not issue new rules or modification of the economy.
Operationalization
The time frame of this paper includes the time since the outbreak of financial crisis in late 2007 until the end of 2010. The analyzed countries are Germany and UK, the analyzed sectors, the financial industry, the automotive sector and the sector of electric mobility. The method applied is discourse analysis. For this, the considered empirical material includes political statements -i.e. speeches, interviews -by heads of government or relevant ministers.
It is crucial here, to answer the question of whether the justification for political decisions is rather close to the influence of material interests or social ideas and to what extent institutions restrict their decision-making. It is important to note that statements made by politicians do not necessarily have to correspond to the actual intentions behind the actions. According to Schirm, however, this dilemma can be avoided. "However, public statements provide evidence for what the government considers to be acceptable to the voters and, therefore, legitimate" (Schirm 2011: 51) . To illustrate the interest variable, the respective sector interests will be analyzed, based on statements made by representatives of business associations or by other key industry representatives. The assumption here is that, even if a politicians' intention to choose a certain policy measure is different from the "official" reason, it is made under consideration of the interest groups' claims.
The operationalization of the variable social ideas includes the position of the population, which can be worked out by opinion polls. This paper will take into account such surveys that explore the relationship between state and market -here: the European Value Study (EVS).
Here, the two countries compared show some differences according to the EVS. The analyze, which of these institutions influenced the decision-making process on state intervention measures.
Case Studies

State intervention measures in the banking sector
United Kingdom
The financial crisis began in the UK at an early stage compared to Germany and is associated with the name Northern Rock, a bank, which had been hit by the American subprime-crisis at the end of 2007. A consequence of this was that the investors panicked, and massive capital withdrawals were made, the biggest in the country for over 100 years. This further exacerbated the situation. After several failed attempts to rescue the bank by other means, such as an acquisition by an investor, the government decided to nationalize the Bank on In this regard, the UK banks are crucial for the supply of finance to the industrial sectors of the real economy, in which the country -in accordance with the VoC -has comparative advantages such as biotech, IT, pharmaceuticals or aerospace (see Soskice 1996) . The engagement of UK banks in these sectors is also due to the fact that the expectations of the financiers generally amount to rates of return of between 30 and 40 percent, which by nature is best realised in fast-growing industries (see Mayer 2002: 317) . The globally-organized UK banking industry therefore provides access to the international capital market. In particular, the placing of short-term credits is well developed in the UK financial markets. This is, not least, the result of the principal of short-term profit-maximization that LMEs follow according to the VoC assumptions. Compared to the previously prevailing key concepts "free market" and "strengthening of the private market forces", which transfigure reality, now the real driving forces of capitalist private sector finally are to be moved to the centre" (Hickel 2005: 647). 8 The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) provides a definition for private equity and explains its relevance for (non-financial) companies. "Private equity is finance provided in return for an equity stake in potentially high growth companies. However, instead of going to the stock market and selling shares to raise capital, private equity firms raise funds from sources such as pension funds, endowments, and high net worth individuals. Private equity firms use these funds, along with borrowed money, to invest in underperforming companies that have the potential for high growth" (To find under the URL http://www.bvca.co.uk/assets/features/show/FAQs). and the respect it enjoys across the world. And the way people still see the centre for capitalraising as London, whether it be equity or debt" (Davies, speech hold on May 28, 2009).
These statements deliver some plausible arguments to suggest that the state intervention measures towards the financial markets can be best explained by material interests. The probably most important intention was to maintain the worldwide position of the UK financial industry.
Germany
In October 2008 the crisis also spread to the German financial system, with the Hypo Real Unlike in the UK, the German discourse regarding the financial sector is not about its size.
The German debate focussed more on the regulation issue, whereby a broad consensus can be seen that more regulation is needed, on the national as well as on the international level (see Spiegel Online, 23.01.2010) . The struggle of the German banking sector and the following rescue packages led to the question of to what extent these programmes were justified. This was particularly important in the context that state-owned and regional banks participated in the trade with risky funded and unfunded credit derivatives, which were irresponsible, inefficient and illegitimate actions, and ignored their public mission to provide the SME's with liquidity (see Schirm 2009: 313) . Huffschmid made an admittedly quite drastic comment regarding the rescue packages for the banks, which according to him was initiated by them.
He called it "extortionate kidnapping of the whole society, which should lead to anxiety, a feeling that there was no alternative and -ultimately -to obedience" (Huffschmid 2008: 8) ,
and which was according to him largely successful against the government.
Leaving aside these statements about the classification of the influence of the banks, the rescue packages fit into the ideational constitution of German society. Despite the fact that the individual bankers were made responsible for the crisis, the wide-spread idea of the government as the fire service in critical situations was applied to the crisis. Just as Simons (1996) Summing up, it can be said that the influence of the material interests to keep the banking sector running can best explain the measures undertaken by the German government. It may be resumed that the instruments and institutional arrangements provided by the CME did not make it necessary to adjust interests or ideas in spite of the economic crisis.
State intervention measures in the automotive industry & electro mobility
United Kingdom
The British car manufacturing industry has undergone rapid changes within the past thirty years. The sector was predominantly characterized by little continuity and asset stripping, accompanied by the closure of assembly plants, which was larger in number than in the rest of Europe. The Conservative governments in the 1980s and early 1990s as well as the following Labour governments put their main focus on the issues of productivity growth and competitiveness. The most important measure of this policy was privatization, and the governments allowed the market forces to downsize manufacturing, which resulted in a general de-industrialization of the country, because the economic future was assumed to be the service sector (see Bailey & Kobayashi 2006; Reitan 2003: 56; Crafts 2007: 274) . The
British carmakers were most affected by this policy, because neither their competitiveness nor their productivity levels were able to deal with these new requirements.
The government simultaneously focused its policies on attracting foreign direct investments.
The effect on the British automotive industry was that the carmakers were taken over by 10 In sum, short-term and long-term loans from banks to non-financial institutes and private persons rose about 5.5 percent from in 2007 (2,470 billion Euros) to 2009 (2,606 billion Euros) (Deutsche Bundesbank 2010c).
companies from abroad. Today, there are no longer any independent British carmakers.
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Instead, the UK has become more and more attractive for green-field investments. It started with the Japanese company Nissan in 1996, followed by the Japanese producers Honda and Toyota and their German competitor BMW. The crucial reason for these investments was, according to Holweg (2009) , the "labour flexibility that makes capacity adjustments in a dynamic market easier, which has given the UK a distinctive advantage over its European peers". A main positive effect of the inflow of fresh capital, which came from the inward investments, was that the productivity growth of the UK manufacturing improved (see Foreman-Peck & Hannah 1999: 49-50) . This was true also for the car producing industry.
Today, the automotive industry in the UK is much smaller but also more productive than thirty years ago and it is also characterized "by significant foreign direct investment and high explained: "We will not repeat the mistakes of the past, when whole industries, vital to the strength of our country, were left to fend for themselves, and whole communities were abandoned. I will not allow that to happen. Instead, we want not just to help the car industry through the recession, but also create the basis on which it can transform itself into an industry fit for the future, ready to prosper and grow when the recovery comes" ). This statement illustrates the government's willingness to leave the path of nonintervention, which it had taken up to now. sector" (DfT & BERR & DIUS 2009: 6) . 14 Despite several critical statements regarding the general need of state intervention, the new British government neither questioned this subsidy.
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Interestingly enough, the automotive industry (as a relatively small sector) seems to be playing an important role for the UK economic policy during the crisis. Politicians from all parts of the political spectrum emphasised the necessity of giving the producing industry a greater prominence in the future. It is interesting that those efforts are made in an industry that faced harsh declines in the past. But its new opportunities (i.e. low-carbon-technology, attraction of FDI) and the (possible) newly defined and more active role of the government as a result of the crisis offer plausible explanations for this.
Germany
Compared to the UK, the German industry as a whole and the automobile industry in particular still have paramount importance for the country's economy. and its British counterpart. Germany, on the one hand, has a large automobile sector that is of significant importance for the country's exports and social welfare, while in the UK the automotive industry is of less total importance for the countries economic performance 14 Compare also Peter Mandelson's statement: "We are committed to making the UK a world leader in lowcarbon transport. We're investing in the skills, research and infrastructure that will attract private investors and help the UK lead the market" (The Independent, December 15, 2009). 15 "Exceptionally, the Government has agreed the announcement of this incentive ahead of the completion of the spending review to support the early market for ultra-low carbon cars. The Government remains committed to reducing the UK's budget deficit, but understands the need for certainty for investors […] " (DfT, press release, 28 July, 2010). compared to the service sector. In the UK, automotive production remains a niche sector of mainly regional importance (West Midlands).
In Germany the automotive sector is considered as one of Germany's key industries, which makes it easy to imagine why the slump in production and sales, the German car market had to cope with during the crisis, were viewed with concern by politics, business and the general public. Within this context, the car scrapping scheme (Abwrackprämie or Umweltprämie) must be taken into account. This instrument had the aim of avoiding a slump in car sales and car production as well as promoting more energy-efficient cars. Germany was one of the first countries to introduce such a scheme, and its car-subsidy programme was also the largest in scale. The incentive was worth 2,500 euros and was paid when an old vehicle was traded in for a new one. 17 The scheme came into force on January 14, 2009 and ran until the end of the year. Its budget was about 1.5 billion euros. 18 The government's intention was to assure consumers that the state had their best interests at heart and was not leaving them alone in times of crisis (cf. 
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Dealing with the question, why the car scrapping scheme has been established, this can be considered as a good example of ideas and interests that reinforce one another. The strength and global notoriety of the German car industry spread the idea that this sector would have to be maintained in the country at all costs. This can also explain why German politics made such a big effort when it came to rescuing Opel, the German subsidiary of General Motors, which suffered under structural problems which have been reinforced because of the crisiswhile ignoring the employees of the also suffering and meanwhile insolvent holding company Arcandor, which was engaged in retail and tourism.
Another field where state intervention measures took place, is the case of low-carbon vehiclepromotion. For this reason an EV summit (Elektroauto-Gipfel) with participants from all relevant companies and institutions was hold on May 3, 2010. In its run-up, this summit has been considered as a turning point for the German government interventionist policy which was very cautious in providing offensive sectoral strategies. But in fact, the government considered itself more as a mediator or agent, without intervening into market decisions. This 17 In addition, the old car had to be more than 9 years old and the new one had to fulfil the European standard Euro-4. 18 Data from taken from Fojcik & Koch & Proff (2009) . 19 For example in the UK, the total scrappage scheme provided a sum of all in all only 300 million pounds (AFP 2009 ).
is even more true, given the fact, that Germany unlike the UK does not provide consumer incentives for the purchase of electric cars. For reaching strategic goals an electro-mobility platform ( ationale Plattform Elektromobilität) has been established to design a strategy to reach the declared political goal to bring 1 million EVs on German streets by 2020 (see BMWi 2010a; BMWi 2010b; Berliner Morgenpost 2010). Meanwhile, the platform has published three interim reports (the latest in May 2012). They show that the perception of fundamental changes in the German industrial policy is by far exaggerated. Instead, the governments focus is mostly on horizontal activities, because according to the platform "intelligent industrial policy" should look after framework conditions first of all (see NPE 2011: 15).
Conclusion
The world financial and economic crisis is the most drastic event of the last years regarding the economic, political and societal systems. The sharp economic downgrade provoked a large number of responses from the affected states. However, as the comparison of Germany and the UK has shown, both countries intervention measures to face the crisis diverged.
While the UK government was first to establish a rescue package for the banks, Germany started the car scrapping scheme before the UK. Both can be explained with the variable interests, while each of these sectors is of particular relevance for the respective country. Most interestingly is the reaction of the UK regarding the automotive industry. The country established an assistance program in order to help the industry. For a LME this can be interpreted as a very uncommon measure. This can be explained by the variable ideas -the UK government wants to provide the country with a strong industrial base. The reliance on the financial sector has been challenged by the crisis, and established a orientation towards a broader industry base. In Germany again, it might surprise that there was no large financial state support to the EV sector. Here, two variables go hand in hand. First, the German automotive industry is internationally competitive and doesn't need financial government support to promote new technologies. Second, the institutional tradition of coordination made still worked during the crisis. Though the automotive industry was declining in these years, these was no need to establish a whole new basis. The typical corporative mechanisms of a CME, with the state as intermediator and initiator of the Nationale Plattform Elektromobilität, were sufficient. The German government actions regarding the financial sector were quiet different, instead. Though, this sector is not as big compared to the UK, it is of particular relevance for the economy. However, that does not mean, that this is also true for every single
